It is no military secret that an opposed river crossing operation is difficult even under ideal conditions. But without adequate standard equipment and with a poor level of training of soldiers and officers, it could become impossible. But the Army Headquarters and Supreme Headquarters had strongly advised against embarking on an opposed river crossing because of inadequacy of equipment and deficiency in the training of troops for such a semi-specialist operation. The Supreme Headquarters had advised on unopposed crossing while the division passed through 1 Division's secure position to capture the town. The Division commander decided to take a grave and calculated risk that could be called bravado. But if the operation had been successful, as it nearly was, it would have been one of the most praiseworthy operations of the entire war. In the end, it failed and the commander had to take the blame for it.
The first landing, in which the Division Commander himself took part, was by all accounts as successful as any opposed river crossing can be. But the follow up of men and materials to back up the first party failed to turn up owing to a mechanical fault in the second ferry and to opposition. All the same, if the first landing party had been well controlled and disciplined enough to hold the bench-head, which it successfully captured on landing, with little or no fighting, instead of running into the town for whatever booty they could grab, a successful effort could have been made for back up men and materials to reach them before they were overrun. When things went completely out of control at the other end, individual soldiers and officers ran for their dear lives, some jumping into the river, some running towards the north and some running southwards into the hands of rebels. But whichever way they went, only very few of them escaped. Only a few who came back in canoes or those who could swim survived. It was a great tragedy.
With the first attempt of the river crossing being such a failure, the men of 2 Division who, in any case, had very little military training and discipline since they were mostly recruits, became so frightened that the second attempt at crossing was a failure from the start. The third attempt almost induced mutiny, chaos and gross disobedience by the troops and open disagreement between the leader and his Division commander.
The first landing, in which the Division Commander himself took part, was by all accounts as successful as any opposed river crossing can be. But the follow up of men and materials to back up the first party failed to turn up owing to a mechanical fault in the second ferry and to opposition. All the same, if the first landing party had been well controlled and disciplined enough to hold the bench-head, which it successfully captured on landing, with little or no fighting, instead of running into the town for whatever booty they could grab, a successful effort could have been made for back up men and materials to reach them before they were overrun. When things went completely out of control at the other end, individual soldiers and officers ran for their dear lives, some jumping into the river, some running towards the north and some running southwards into the hands of rebels. But whichever way they went, only very few of them escaped. Only a few who came back in canoes or those who could swim survived. It was a great tragedy.
With the first attempt of the river crossing being such a failure, the men of 2 Division who, in any case, had very little military training and discipline since they were mostly recruits, became so frightened that the second attempt at crossing was a failure from the start. The third attempt almost induced mutiny, chaos and gross disobedience by the troops and open disagreement between the leader and his Division commander.
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